Suchergebnisse

ZusammenfassungWie bewerten Parteidelegierte das Vertreten lokaler Interessen von ihren Abgeordneten, die über geschlossene Listen gewählt worden sind? Die bisherige Forschung erwartet klare Unterschiede im Verhalten von Abgeordneten in Mischwahlsystemen, die direkt und solchen, die über (geschlossene) Parteilisten gewählt werden. Doch wie ausschlaggebend ist die Vertretung lokaler Interessen für die Delegierten selbst? Dieser Beitrag will zeigen, dass Parteidelegierte – auch von Parteien die hauptsächlich Listenmandate erringen – auch von ihren Listenabgeordneten das Vertreten lokaler Interessen bevorzugen. Mithilfe eines Conjoint-Experiments mit 560 Delegierten fünf deutscher Bundestagsparteien, die ihre Kandidierenden über Delegiertenversammlungen aufstellen, wird gezeigt, dass Delegierte aller Parteien Listenabgeordnete bevorzugen, die die Interessen des eigenen Kreisverbandes vertreten. Während der Herkunftsort der Delegierten keinen Einfluss auf diese Präferenz hat, gibt es Unterschiede zwischen den Parteien in wie wichtig das Vertreten lokaler Interessen für die Entscheidungsfindung der Delegierten ist verglichen mit anderen Faktoren. Die Befunde dieser Studie haben Implikationen für die Untersuchungen politischen Verhaltens für Abgeordnete.

Party membership seems to lose relevance for political careers in many established democracies. Increasing numbers of parties are recruiting non-members as candidates. Yet, what are the implications of a lack of long-term party membership for party cohesion? In this paper, I argue that pre-parliamentary party membership is in fact crucial for cohesion. Using data from the Comparative Candidate Survey and voting behavior of ca. 2,000 MPs of the German Bundestag on free votes from 1953 to 2013, I examine the effect of length of previous party membership and the age of joining the party on indicators of party cohesion. Examining free votes allows for credibly controlling alternative explanations of unified voting behavior. Results are in line with expectations generated from social identity theory and underscore the importance of party membership for party cohesion. The paper concludes with a discussion on the findings' implications in light of recent developments in parties' candidate recruitment.

AbstractParty elites selecting candidates are crucial for the composition of parliament. Yet, despite their pivotal position within the party, we know only little about their preferences for potential candidates and how their own backgrounds shape these preferences. This paper presents results from a conjoint experiment carried out with party delegates chosen to select the candidates for five German parties in the run-up to three state elections. Theoretical expectations derived from the principle-agent framework on delegates' preferences in candidates are evaluated. Analyses show that delegates prefer attributes indicative of quality and socio-demographic similarity in candidates. Additionally, I show that these preferences for candidates differ between inexperienced and experienced delegates, the latter showing a stronger preference for valence attributes in candidates. These findings contribute to our understanding of the role of personal attributes of selectors for candidate selection and hold crucial implications for the composition of legislatures and long-term effects on public policy.

Candidate‐selection methods (CSM) crucially affect the behavior of Members of Parliament (MPs). Extant research investigates the consequentiality of the selectorate, but is neglecting the candidacy dimension of CSM. But what are the behavioral implications of minimal candidacy‐eligibility criteria (CEC)? I theorize that parties adopt closed CEC in safe districts to ensure nominating loyalist candidates, while they use open CEC in contested districts to attract entrepreneur candidates able to woo decisive swing voters. Using survey and observational data from Japan, where parties have concurrently been nominating candidates through open and more closed CEC, I show that entrepreneur candidates are more responsive to their districts but less active in the legislature, measured by different types of activities. These findings corroborate my expectations that entrepreneur candidates lack political experience and are sidelined by their more traditional colleagues. Moreover, the results broaden our understanding of how CSM affect MPs' behavior.

Extant research suggests that candidate selection methods can be consequential for party unity in legislative voting. Yet thus far, only variations in the selectorate and the degree of centralization have been examined. This article argues that Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), too, have implications for party unity. I theorize that with stricter formal requirements, parties avoid adverse selection and ensure the nomination of committed candidates. By using roll-call vote data from 16 industrial democracies, candidate surveys and an original data set consisting of nearly 500 historical party constitutions, I show that parties demanding prior membership and nudging aspirants to maintain networks within the party tend to be more unified in parliamentary voting. Moreover, their candidates, too, express greater loyalty when compared with parties without formal CEC. Thus, this article contributes to the literatures on party unity and on candidate selection by showing how certain party rules, hitherto neglected, affect party unity.

Candidate-selection methods (CSM) crucially affect the behavior of Members of Parliament (MPs). Extant research investigates the consequentiality of the selectorate, but is neglecting the candidacy dimension of CSM. But what are the behavioral implications of minimal candidacy-eligibility criteria (CEC)? I theorize that parties adopt closed CEC in safe districts to ensure nominating loyalist candidates, while they use open CEC in contested districts to attract entrepreneur candidates able to woo decisive swing voters. Using survey and observational data from Japan, where parties have concurrently been nominating candidates through open and more closed CEC, I show that entrepreneur candidates are more responsive to their districts but less active in the legislature, measured by different types of activities. These findings corroborate my expectations that entrepreneur candidates lack political experience and are sidelined by their more traditional colleagues. Moreover, the results broaden our understanding of how CSM affect MPs' behavior. ; Peer Reviewed

Extant research suggests that candidate selection methods can be consequential for party unity in legislative voting. Yet thus far, only variations in the selectorate and the degree of centralization have been examined. This article argues that Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), too, have implications for party unity. I theorize that with stricter formal requirements, parties avoid adverse selection and ensure the nomination of committed candidates. By using roll-call vote data from 16 industrial democracies, candidate surveys and an original data set consisting of nearly 500 historical party constitutions, I show that parties demanding prior membership and nudging aspirants to maintain networks within the party tend to be more unified in parliamentary voting. Moreover, their candidates, too, express greater loyalty when compared with parties without formal CEC. Thus, this article contributes to the literatures on party unity and on candidate selection by showing how certain party rules, hitherto neglected, affect party unity. ; Peer Reviewed

Party membership seems to lose importance for political careers. In the wake of political dealignment and dwindling numbers in party membership, an increasing number of parties have started to recruit candidates without prior party membership. What are the implications of this trend in elite recruitment for candidate loyalty, party unity and legislators' activity in parliament? This thesis empirically addresses these questions by making use of several novel and self-collected quantitative data-sets. First, the thesis explores the formal eligibility criteria within parties that aspirants for candidacies have to fulfill. By using data based on roughly 500 self-collected (historical) party constitutions, data on parties' parliamentary voting records and candidate survey data, this thesis finds that candidacy eligibility criteria that presume a minimum length of prior party membership are associated with greater party unity and candidate loyalty. Secondly, I explore how prior party membership affects to behavior of legislators. Expectations generated from social identity theory are put to empirical tests using data on all Member of Parliament of the German Bundestag from 1953 to 2013, and their voting behavior on unwhipped votes. Longer spells of prior and active party membership are associated with greater coherence, theorized to be the product of socialization processes into parties' norms and values. Finally, the consequences of long-term party membership respective the lack thereof are investigated by taking advantage of the Japanese case. I explore the behavioral differences of candidates nominated through open recruitment and those nominated through traditional channels, as has been practiced by major Japanese parties. I _nd that those candidates nominated under open recruitment, oftentimes lacking prior party membership and political experience, are ill-prepared for legislative office at the national level. Compared to their more traditional colleagues, these candidates are less active in parliament. In ...

Committee chairs hold crucial positions in the legislative process and can push or quell legislative initiatives. While extant studies examine the formal powers and legislative consequences of committee chairs, we know less about their appointment. We examine who ruling parties (principal) appoint to committee chairs (agent) in order to minimize the risk of policy moving away from government positions. Using data from Japan (2003–2017) on the LDP, we test expectations derived from the principal‐agent framework, conditional on committee type. Japan makes an ideal case to study intraparty chair appointments due to its coalitions' office‐allocation patterns. We find that the party leadership appoints as chairs ideologically close MPs to committees with jurisdiction on high policy. However, we find no effect for chair appointments on particularistic committees. Using additional data on bill‐amendment rates, we emphasize the legislative consequences of political appointments in the legislative process.

In most developed democracies, parties adjust their positions to polls and public opinion. Yet, in a coalition government, the policy that emerges is often the outcome of negotiations between governing parties. We argue that the credibility of exit threats by current coalition members and the importance of outside parties for the formation of potential alternative coalitions both matter for policy adoption. Building on a new data set measuring the expected coalition‐inclusion probabilities of parties in parliamentary democracies, we estimate the effect of coalition prospects on an important policy outcome—environmental policy stringency—in nine European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our findings demonstrate that only polling shifts that alter coalition probabilities affect outcomes. Changes in the coalition‐inclusion probability of green parties—regardless of whether they are in government—predict changes in the environmental policy stringency of sitting governments. Political polls, in contrast, do not.

In most developed democracies, parties adjust their positions to polls and public opinion. Yet, in a coalition government, the policy that emerges is often the outcome of negotiations between governing parties. We argue that the credibility of exit threats by current coalition members and the importance of outside parties for the formation of potential alternative coalitions both matter for policy adoption. Building on a new data set measuring the expected coalition-inclusion probabilities of parties in parliamentary democracies, we estimate the effect of coalition prospects on an important policy outcome—environmental policy stringency—in nine European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our findings demonstrate that only polling shifts that alter coalition probabilities affect outcomes. Changes in the coalition-inclusion probability of green parties—regardless of whether they are in government—predict changes in the environmental policy stringency of sitting governments. Political polls, in contrast, do not. ; Peer Reviewed

In most developed democracies, parties adjust their positions to polls and public opinion. Yet, in a coalition government, the policy that emerges is often the outcome of negotiations between governing parties. We argue that the credibility of exit threats by current coalition members and the importance of outside parties for the formation of potential alternative coalitions both matter for policy adoption. Building on a new data set measuring the expected coalition‐inclusion probabilities of parties in parliamentary democracies, we estimate the effect of coalition prospects on an important policy outcome—environmental policy stringency—in nine European countries between 1990 and 2012. Our findings demonstrate that only polling shifts that alter coalition probabilities affect outcomes. Changes in the coalition‐inclusion probability of green parties—regardless of whether they are in government—predict changes in the environmental policy stringency of sitting governments. Political polls, in contrast, do not.

Policy in coalition governments (a) depends on negotiations between parties that (b) continue between elections. No extant means of predicting policy - bargaining power indices, vote shares, seat shares, polling, veto players or measures of electoral competitiveness - recognizes both of these facts. We conceptualize, estimate and validate the first dynamic measure of parties' bargaining leverage intended to predict policy and politics. We argue that those parties with the greatest leverage in policy negotiations are those with the highest probability of participating in an alternative government, were one to form. Combining a large set of political polls and an empirical coalition formation model developed with out-of-sample testing, we estimate coalition inclusion probabilities for parties in a sample of 21 parliamentary democracies at a monthly frequency over four decades. Applications to government spending and to the stringency of environmental policy show leverage from coalition inclusion probabilities to be strongly predictive while the primary alternatives - vote shares, seat shares and polls - are not.